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The Importance of Audit Firm
Characteristics and the Drivers of Auditor
Change in UK Listed Companies
Vivien Beattie and Stella Fearnley^
Abstract—This paper explores the importance of audit firm characteristics and the factors motivating auditor change
based on questionnaire responses from 210 listed UK companies (a response rate of 70%). Twenty-nine potentially
desirable auditor characteristics are identified from the extant literature and their importance elicited. Exploratory
factor analysis reduces these variables to eight uncorrelated underlying dimensions: reputation/quality; acceptability
to third parties; value for money; ability to provide non-audit services; small audit firm; specialist industry
knowledge; non-Big Six large audit firm; and geographical proximity. Insights into the nature of'the Big Six factor"
emerge. Two thirds of companies had recently considered changing auditors; the main reasons cited being audit fee
level, dissatisfaction with audit quality and changes in top management. Of those companies that considered change,
73% did not actually do so, the main reasons cited being fee reduction by the incumbent and avoidance of disruption.
Thus audit fee levels are both a key precipitator of change and a key factor in retaining the status quo.
Introduction
Significant changes have occurred in the UK audit-
ing environment during the last decade. The relax-
ation of ethical guidelines concerning advertising
and solicitation, the introduction of auditor regis-
tration and monitoring and the economic recession
have led to a relative shift in the cost and demand
parameters of the audit services market and hence
in competitive pressures. Observed behavioural
changes by market participants include tendering,
aggressive fee renegotiation and opinion shopping
by auditees, and low-balling (i,e, predatory pricing),
response to auditees' opinion shopping behaviour
and merger activity by auditors.
Although it is difficult to make causal inferences,
these changes have undoubtedly had an impact on
the structure of the audit services market. Recent
evidence concerning the UK listed company market
indicates an increase in both seller concentration
and the instability of client-auditor relationships
(Beattie and Fearnley, 1994), Their study reports
measures of seller concentration for the period
1987-1991 using a database of 2,079 fully listed
and USM domestic companies. The increase in
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the eight-finn concentration ratio from 0,64 to
0,79 was partitioned into three categories: a 0,09
increase attributable to audit firm mergers, a
0,07 increase due to voluntary client-auditor
realignments and a countervailing decrease of 0,01
due to the impact of market entrants,' Thus both
audit firm mergers and voluntary realignments
were significant causes of the rise in concentration.
At the 20-firm level, however, the overall increase
from 0,83 to 0,9 resulted primarily from voluntary
realignments,
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) also report that
a total of 341 companies (16,4%) voluntarily
changed their auditors at least once during
1987-1991, Of these changes, 40% were classed as
intra-audit tier changes and 60% as inter-audit tier
changes, with the tiers being defined as the top
eight firms, firms 9-20 and those below the top 20,
Given the overall increase in seller concentration,
it is not surprising that the top tier gained the
largest number of clients.
This macro-level description of change within
the market for audit services can, however, offer
limited insight into the competitive pressures and
processes that give rise to the observed change.
The present study therefore builds on existing
research by examining the importance of audit firm
characteristics and the factors motivating auditor
change at the micro-level.
The extant auditor choice literature encompasses
both the auditor change decision and the auditor
selection decision. It is generally agreed that no
comprehensive, well-specified theory of either
'The concentration ratios quoted are based on number of
clients.
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auditor change or selection currently exists,
although empirical and theoretical research during
the last 25 years has provided a theoretical frame-
work within which such issues can be addressed.
To date, there has been no systematic empirical
study of the auditor choice process in the UK,
To our knowledge, existing empirical studies relate
exclusively to the US, with the exception of an
Australian study by Craswell (1988), Given the
different environments (especially regulatory envir-
onments) that exist across countries, it is important
to conduct auditor choice studies in different
countries, and perform cross-country comparisons
in order to gain new insights (Wallace, 1987), The
purpose of this study is to contribute to the auditor
choice literature by examining the influences on
the auditor choice decision in a country where this
decision has not been studied and following a
period of rapid and significant environmental up-
heaval within the auditing profession (see above),
A postal questionnaire survey of listed companies
is used to elicit information concerning the import-
ance of audit firm characteristics and factors that
infiuence the auditor change decision, A random
sample of 300 companies was surveyed, resulting
in 210 usable replies, which represents a 70%
response rate,
A factor analysis of 29 potentially desirable audit
firm characteristics reveals a number of common
underlying dimensions of importance to companies.
The extent to which companies consider changing
auditors, the main reasons for this and the reasons
for not subsequently changing auditors are also
explored.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. Section two reviews the extant auditor
choice literature, which forms the basis of the
content of the research instrument. Section three
outlines the sample and data collection procedures
employed. The results, together with discussion,
are presented in the fourth section. The final
section summarises and concludes.
Auditor choice literature
In conceptualising the auditor choice process it is
important to recognise that auditor choice emerges
from the client's characteristics, potential auditors'
characteristics and the auditing environment, A
significant change in one (or more) of these three
areas is required for a client to decide to change
their auditor, since the costs of switching are
material,- The auditor change process is usefully
separated into two stages, as suggested by Francis
and Wilson (1988, p, 668), since the reasons for
displacement of the former auditor might be un-
related to the specific choice criteria used in selecting
-DeAngelo {1981b, p. 188) cites the low rate at which firms
change auditors as evidence of significant switching costs.
the new auditor. Companies first decide to change
auditors and then make a reselection. Auditor
displacement may be motivated by a change in
company circumstances (i,e, by factors unconnected
with the current audit firm's performance) such as
a change in top management or by specific problems
and disagreements. The reasons for change are,
therefore, not necessarily related to generic audit
firm characteristics and also not necessarily involved
in the choice of a new auditor. Although there
exists a common set of factors underlying change
and choice decisions, both decisions also have
unique factors.
The demand for audit services in free and
regulated markets was examined by Wallace
(1980), Three separate but interlinked sources
of demand are identified: agency (or stewardship)
demand, information demand and insurance de-
mand. Agency theory, as developed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), indicates that the bonding role of
an audit can reduce agency costs arising from the
self-interested behaviour of agents. The existence
of differential agency costs across clients and over
time therefore results in a heterogeneous demand
for audit services, characterised by DeAngelo
(1981a, b) as different levels of audit quality.
The information demand for audit, originally
explored by Dopuch and Simunic (1980 and 1982),
is closely related to the agency demand, since it also
arises from information asymmetries. The selection
of credible auditors not only signals management's
honesty and quality to all interested parties, but
also reduces agency costs via the monitoring
function. The arguments of both DeAngelo and
Dopuch and Simunic are often referred to as the
'product differentiation hypothesis'. More recent
analytical studies have employed the information/
signalling framework to explore the implications of
auditor choice (Bar-Yosef and Livnat, 1984; Titman
and Trueman, 1986; and Dye, 1991), The insurance
dimension of an audit forms the basis of the third
source of demand. It is argued that the audit serves
to indemnify investors and creditors against finan-
cial losses via the auditor's professional liability
exposure.
Each of these three sources of audit demand
generates a rank ordering of auditors, DeAngelo
(1981b) argues that auditor size serves as a
surrogate for audit quality, since larger firms have
reduced incentives to lower audit quality opportun-
istically in order to retain any single client, Dopuch
and Simunic (1980 and 1982) infer that credibility
is associated with an auditor's reputation or brand
name, based on the observed dominance of large
Mt has since been recognised that industry-specific reputation is
an important alternative basis for rating audit firm credibility
(Simunic and Stein, 1986, p. 71).
''Both credibility and reputation refer to perceived audit
quality, since audit quality per se is unobservable (or at least
extremely costly to evaluate).
AUTUMN 1995 229
audit firms in the market for publicly-held com-
pany auditors.'-'' Finally, a number of writers argue
that larger audit firms have 'deeper pockets' than
smaller firms due to their higher level of insurance.
This consideration of demand-side factors sug-
gests a number of client characteristics that will
affect the type of audit firm selected, in terms of its
quality and credibility. These characteristics centre
on agency-related variables, such as size, level of
gearing and management share ownership. These
factors will determine the general size, class and/or
industry specialisation of the audit firm selected.
The specific audit firm chosen is also influenced by
supply-side factors, i.e. auditor characteristics.
In particular, audit firm specialisation in audit
technologies can be expected to yield economies of
both scale and scope.'
Additional auditor characteristics of relevance
relate to the audit team, rather than the firm
generally, and reflect the quality of working
relationships. Other relevant client or auditor
characteristics include the existence of significant
foreign operations (Eichenseher, 1985), the exist-
ence of interlocking directorates between client
companies (Davison et al., 1984), the association
between client and auditor structures (Kaplan et al.,
1990) and the geographical proximity of the auditor
(Stokes, 1992). Based on these arguments, client-
auditor alignments can be viewed as the minimum
cost match between client needs and auditor
services. A significant change in either the client
or auditor's characteristics can therefore induce a
realignment if the other party is either unable or
unwilling to accommodate it.
Early empirical studies collected management's
declared reasons for actual auditor changes using
open-ended questionnaires (Burton and Roberts,
1967; Carpenter and Strawser, 1971; Bedingfleld
and Loeb, 1974; and Eichenseher and Shields,
1983). The most frequently cited reasons for change
were changes in top management, need for addi-
tional services/dissatisfaction with services oflered,
audit fee too high, need for new financing, takeover
by another company, poor working relationships
and technical disagreements.
Statistical studies have examined the association
between either (i) specific client or auditor char-
acteristics and observed auditor choices, or (ii)
changes in these characteristics and observed
auditor changes. Firth and Smith (1992) find that
the selection of a Big Eight audit firm (a brand
name proxy for audit quality) is associated with
agency cost variables and the need for signalling.
The propensity to change auditors has been found
to be positively related to disagreements (DeAngelo,
^Scale economies permit firms to offer competitive fees while
scope economies, which result from knowledge spillovers, facili-
tate the provision of sophisticated audit services in addition to a
range of non-audit services.
1982), financial distress (Schwartz and Menon,
1985), initial public offerings (Menon and Williams,
1991), the early and late stages of the auditor-client
relationship (Levinthal and Fichman, 1988), and
receipt of a qualified audit opinion (Chow and
Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; and Citron and TaflHer,
1992) (although this latter finding is not supported
by Schwartz and Menon, 1985).'' The propensity to
change auditors has, however, been found not to be
related to the level of non-audit services purchased
(De Berg et al., 1991).
In more recent multivariate studies, Williams
(1988) finds that the propensity to change auditors
is negatively related to the incumbent's industry
specialisation and tenure and positively related to
the receipt of adverse media publicity by the client
company. Using panel data, Lindahl (1992) finds
that client company financial distress, size and
mergers, and the market share and size of the
auditor are all associated with auditor changes.
Haskins and Williams (1990) focus on intra-Big
Eight auditor changes, finding that the most
important factors associated with such changes are
client financial distress, size and growth, together
with audit firm fee levels and industry dominance.
Johnson and Lys (1990) report that the direction
of auditor change, in terms of relative audit firm
size (a proxy for differences in audit firm cost
structures), can generally be attributed to changes
in client characteristics that influence supplier costs
(expansion, financing, profitability and audit
risk). Francis and Wilson (1988) find that, after
controlling for client size and growth, changes
to/from a Big Eight firm are associated with agency
cost variables. Healy and Lys (1986) find that
companies audited by a non-Big Eight firm are
more likely to retain a Big Eight acquirer following
an audit firm merger if they benefit from the Big
Eight firm's specialised services and/or reputation.
Studies have also examined several consequences
of auditor change. Companies that change auditors
following receipt of a qualified opinion have been
shown in some studies to receive 'improved'
opinions (Craswell, 1988), whereas other studies
show no such shift (Chow and Rice, 1982 and
Smith, 1986). DeBerg et al. (1991) find evidence
that the level of non-audit services purchased
declines following auditor change. Studies have
shown generally negative overall share price reac-
tions to auditor changes, although in most cases
there are no systematic abnormal returns (Fried
and Schiff, 1981; Nichols and Smith, 1983; Smith,
1988; and Johnson and Lys, 1990).
'Krishnan (1992) distinguishes 'internal" opinion shopping,
where incumbent auditors and companies negotiate to reach a
mutually acceptable opinion, from 'external" opinion shopping
(a substitute behaviour), where companies search for more
accommodating auditors. He finds that auditor changers, as
failed internal opinion shoppers, face stricter standards than
non-changers in the year prior to change.
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There is, however, evidence that auditor changes
associated with disagreements, qualified audit
opinions and changes away from Big Eight auditors
result in statistically significant negative price
movements, especially at high levels of manage-
ment ownership (Smith, 1988; Eichenseher et al.,
1989; and Albrecht and Lamy, 1992). With regard
to audit fee cutting following change, Francis
(1984) finds no evidence of this whereas Simon and
Francis (1988) and Ettredge and Greenberg (1992)
find an average discount in the initial year of 24%
and 25% respectively.'
Methods
Sample Selection and Construction of Mailing List
The sample is drawn from the population of
domestic officially listed and USM companies in
the UK and Ireland as at 30 April 1992. An alpha-
betical listing of company names was obtained
from Extel Financial Ltd. This data set also con-
tained addresses and the name of either the finance
director or (in the absence of this) the company
secretary. A systematic sample of 300 was selected
from this list, i.e. every seventh company.
Research Materials and Questionnaire Administra-
tion Procedures
The questionnaire used closed-form questions
and contained six sections. The first section con-
tained general questions, while the second section
elicited the importance of 29 audit firm character-
istics using a five-point Likert-type scale with
verbal anchors. Questions in the second section
are framed as a generic task, in that no specific
reference is made to the company's current audit
firm. The third section identified those companies
which had considered making a voluntary change
in auditors during the past five years, elicited how
seriously this change had been considered and
asked the respondent to indicate which of 26
reasons caused a change to be considered. The
remainder of the questionnaire forms part of a
separate paper. The draft questionnaire was pre-
tested with the assistance of several senior business
executives and audit partners and the content,
ordering and terminology was revised accordingly.
The reasons offered for considering an auditor
change resulted from an analysis of the declared
reasons for change cited in prior questionnaire
studies and hypothesised variables from statistical
auditor change studies, with 26 distinct themes
being identified. The 29 auditor characteristics
'Simon and Francis (1988) found that this fee discount in the
initial year persisted, at reduced levels, for approximately two
years, and appeared to result partly from "low balling'. Ettredge
and Greenberg (1992) found that the size of fee discounts in the
initial year was associated with changes in audit quality and
technological efficiency and the number of auditors bidding on
the engagement.
whose importance was rated by respondents were
derived by extracting relevant themes from the
potential change drivers (rewording as necessary)
and from a review of the auditor choice literature.
Several additional characteristics were added during
piloting.
The questionnaire was accompanied by an
explanatory covering letter which assured the
confidentiality of responses. A return envelope was
also provided. The questionnaires were serially
numbered to permit non-respondents to be followed
up. A reminder letter was sent out after 10 days,
with a second request (accompanied by a duplicate
copy of the questionnaire and the original covering
letter) being sent after a further 10 days.
Results
Response Rate and Tests for Bias
From the total sample of 300, 225 responses
were received. Fifteen responses were not usable
for a variety of reasons, leaving 210 usable replies,
representing a response rate of 70%.** This rate
compares very favourably with those obtained in
recent UK studies covering similar populations of
companies and respondents.
A number of tests for response bias were
performed. First, responding and non-responding
companies were compared on the basis of size
(measured as total assets) using the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney non-parametric test. The hypoth-
esis that the two groups have been drawn from the
same population was not rejected (a = 0.05). This
comparison was also applied to early (first 70)
and late (last 70) responders, on the assumption
that late responders are similar to non-responders
(Oppenheim, 1966, p. 34). Again, the null hypoth-
esis of no difference was not rejected (a = 0.05).'
Finally, the companies were formed into four broad
industrial groupings based on Stock Exchange
groups (capital goods, consumer goods, other and
financial). A chi-squared test indicated an associ-
ation between industry and response/non-response
(a =0.01). The percentage of responders was
highest among the 'other' group (86%) and lowest
among the financial group (61%). Despite the
limitations of such tests (discussed by Wallace
and Mellor, 1988), given the high response rate
obtained, we conclude that response bias is not a
serious threat to the validity of our results. Table 1
"Five companies indicated that they did not wish to partici-
pate due to lack of management time, four said that their
company policy was not to participate in questionnaires of this
nature, three said that their auditor choice was in the hands of
a parent company or comparable to another company in the
sample, two said that the addressee had left the company and
one company was in voluntary liquidation.
'Further tests for response bias comparing early and late
responders were not conducted since the questionnaire did not
contain suitable key summary variables.
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Table 1
Analysis of Respondents by Company Size and
Industry Group
]
Size group
Small
Medium
Large
^otal assets
(£m)
<20
20-100
^100
No.
74
80
52
206*
*Data on four newly listed companies
available.
Industry group
Capital goods
Consumer goods
Other (including
three oil and gas
companies)
Financial
Response
rate
74%
63%
61%
86%
No.
70
48
50
42
210
%
35.9
38.8
25.3
100.0
were not
%
33.3
22.9
23.8
20.0
100.0
provides an analysis of the respondents by size and
industry.
A further factor that can affect the validity of
questionnaire responses is the suitability of indi-
vidual respondents, who should be both knowl-
edgeable about the relevant practices, and involved
in the relevant decisions at a senior level. Based on
title, the respondents were: finance director (58%),
company secretary (12%), financial controller (9%),
director (6%), accountant (5%), chief accountant
(3%) and other/not stated (7%). It is clear that
nearly all respondents are senior executives who
would be intimately involved in the auditor choice
decision.'" The risk of uninformed respondent bias
is therefore minimal.
Audit Finn Characteristics
Section two of the questionnaire asked respond-
ents to indicate the importance to their company of
each of 29 audit firm characteristics, using a scale
of 1 to 5. The questions did not relate specifically to
the company's current audit firm, rather they were
set in a generic context. The results are summarised
in Table 2. Over the group as a whole, the three
most important characteristics to emerge were:
(i) integrity of firm; (ii) technical competence of
firm; and (iii) quality of working relationship with
audit partner(s). When each individual respondent
was asked to identify the three most important
characteristics to them, technical competence of
firm service was most frequently cited over the three
slots (n = 86), followed by value for money of audit
"The questionnaire revealed that it is the finance director
who is most frequently responsible for negotiating the audit fee
with the auditors and who is most influential in the appointment
process (detailed results not reported here).
(n = 84) and quality of working relationship with
audit partner (n = 59) (see Table 3). Interestingly,
Big Six audit firm was cited by 40 companies as
a top three characteristic, despite the fact that it
ranked only 20th for the group of respondents as
a whole.
Clearly there exist significant within-group vari-
ations in preferences with respect to audit firm
characteristics. We investigated the extent to which
company size or industry group could explain these
differences. First, we classified the 210 respondents
as small or large based on the median level of
total assets. Using a two-tailed t-test, statistically
significant differences (at the 10% level) between
the two groups in terms of their responses to the
29 characteristics in Table 2 emerged for 11 charac-
teristics (see third-last column of Table 2). Ten of
these characteristics were rated as of significantly
more importance by large companies: technical
competence of audit partner; ethical standards
of audit partner; technical competence of audit
engagement staff; audit quality; willingness to offer
guidance on accounting principles; quality of advice
to management; Big Six audit firm; acceptability to
company's regulators; specialist knowledge of your
industry; and existence of offices located close to
principal accounting functions. One characteristic
was rated as of significantly less importance by
large companies: low absolute level of audit fee.
Second, we classified the 210 respondents into
four broad industrial groupings based on Stock
Exchange groups (capital goods, consumer goods,
financial and other) and conducted a Kruskal-
Wallis test to determine whether any statistically
significant differences existed among the four
groups (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 206-212).
Significant differences (at the 10% level) emerged
for seven of the 29 characteristics: quality of work-
ing relationships with audit partner; willingness to
offer guidance on accounting principles; same audit
firm as other group companies; willingness to
provide detailed cost information; specialist knowl-
edge of your industry; existence of offices located
close to principal accounting functions; and a local
audit firm (see second-last column of Table 2).
The first four of these characteristics were most
important to capital goods companies, the fifth
and seventh to financial companies and the sixth to
consumer goods companies.
Subsequent multiple comparison procedures
based on Tukey's studentised range test (SAS, 1990,
ch. 13) revealed, however, that in the case of
the second, sixth and seventh characteristics listed
above, no pairwise comparisons were significant at
the 5% level." Capital goods companies rated the
"This lack of any significant pairwise differences is not
unusual, since the Tukey test is conservative in that it controls
the type 1 experimentwise error rate.
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Table 3
The Three Most Important Auditor Characteristics
1.
2,
3.
4.
5.
Auditor characteristic
Technical competence of firm
Value for money of audit service
Quality of working relationship
with audit partner(s)
Integrity of firm
Big Six audit firm
Most
important
38'
20'=
18"
20'"
26^
Individuai ranking frequency *
2nd most
important
29'
24-
16"
20'
8"=
lird most
important
19'
40'
25^
18"
5"=
Totai"'
86
84
59
58
40
Group rank
{from
Tabie 2)
2
6
3
1
20
Notes:
*Superscripts indicate the rank of characteristics within each top three slot (thus, for example, 18 respondents
cited 'quality of working relationship with audit partner(s)' as the most important auditor characteristie and
this was the sixth most frequently cited sueh reason).
•Auditor characteristics are shown in decreasing frequency of total citations across the three top slots.
quality of working relationship with audit partner
and common group auditor of significantly more
importance than financial companies, and willing-
ness to provide detailed cost information of more
importance than consumer goods companies.
Financial companies rated specialist industry
knowledge of more importance than the other
three industrial groups.
Since 41% of the respondents had audit
committees, we investigated whether this feature
influenced the importance attributed to auditor
characteristics. The final column of Table 2 reports
the two-tailed significance level of a t-test between
the two groups. Significant differences (at the
5% level) emerged for 13 of the 29 characteristics.
With the exception of 'ability to provide additional
consultancy services' and 'a regional audit firm',
these characteristics were rated of more importance
by companies with an audit committee.
It is to be expected that many of the 29 audit
firm characteristics will be highly correlated. An
exploratory factor analysis was performed using
the principal components method with varimax
rotation in an attempt to uncover the critical
underlying dimensions. Eight initial factors were
extracted, based on the eigenvalue ^ 1 criterion
(Kim and Mueller, 1978, p, 49). These factors
explained 64% of the variance among the audit
firm characteristics.
Table 4 summarises these eight factors, providing
a subjective factor label based on each factor's con-
stituent auditor characteristics. Those constituent
characteristics with factor loadings greater than
10,501 (i,e, 25 out of 29) are also shown, together
with their factor loadings. This analysis reveals the
importance of auditors' acceptability to third parties
and ability to provide non-audit services (factors
two and four respectively), which are auditor
characteristics not rating highly in Table 2. It is
interesting to note that the auditor characteristic
of being a Big Six firm does not emerge from the
factor analysis. In fact this characteristic appears
to be multidimensional, being positively associated
with factors 1, 2, 6 and 8, and negatively associated
with factor 5 (the relevant factor loadings are
0,24, 0,28, 0,36, 0,37 and -0,29 respectively).
This finding provides empirical support for the
arguments that these firms enjoy a reputation that
makes them more acceptable to third parties, that
they are more likely to possess specialist industry
knowledge and be located nearby. There are
clearly, however, a significant number of com-
panies which reject such firms in favour of either
small audit firms (factor 5) or larger, non-Big Six
audit firms (factor 7). Nor does the eighth-ranked
auditor characteristic 'technical competence of
audit engagement staff' appear in the factor
analysis. This characteristic is two-dimensional,
with positive loadings of 0,48 on factor 1 and 0,46
on factor 3.
It is noticeable from Tables 2 and 4 that there
are several auditor characteristics that are not
ranked of high importance, but which nevertheless
load on factors. In particular, factor 2 (accept-
ability to third parties) comprises five related
characteristics ranked 14, 17, 18, 19 and 21. This
result can be attributed to the existence of five
questions which clearly relate to the same dimen-
sion. While most respondents were concerned about
the auditor's acceptability to a specific third party,
there were very few concerned about more than
one group (this is apparent from the high standard
deviation in Table 2). Thus the average importance
of each characteristic was low. In addition, factors
4-8 include characteristics of middle and low im-
portance. There is, in fact, a distinct drop between
factors 1-3 and 4-8 in the proportion of variance
explained by these factors.
Auditor Change Consideration
Section three of the questionnaire asked our
210 respondents to indicate how seriously they
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Table 5
Stated Reasons for Consideration of a Change in Auditor
Reason *
1. Level of audit fee
2. Dissatisfaction with audit quality (i.e. auditor's ability to detect problems)
3. Changes in company's top management
4. Company growth required increased technical capacity from audit firm
5. Need for group auditor rationalisation
6. High turnover of audit engagement staff
7 = . Merger/takeover with/by another company
7 = . Need for additional services
9 = . Audit firm merger
9 = . Use of inexperienced audit engagement staff
11. Need for Big Six audit firm
12. Personality clashes with audit partner/staff
13 = . Change in audit partner
13 = . Poor working relationships with audit partner/staff
15 = . Need for multinational audit firm with foreign oflices in same geographical
areas as client's operations
15 = . Disagreements over accounting principles
17 = . Influence of merchant bankers/underwriter
17 = . Inaccessibility of audit partner
19 = . Influence of actual or potential equity or loan providers
19 = . Need for audit firm specialising (or not) in client's industry
21. Need for national, rather than local, audit firm
22. Disagreement with audit opinion
23 = . Influence of regulators
23 = . Need for audit firm with local domestic office
25. Influence of company's day-to-day bankers
26. Need for local, rather than national, audit firm
*Reasons are shown in decreasing frequency of citation.
Number of
companies
92
46
34
25
24
22
20
20
19
19
18
17
15
15
12
12
10
10
7
7
6
5
4
4
3
1
%
(n = 139)
66
33
25
18
17
16
14
14
14
14
13
12
11
II
9
9
7
7
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
1
had considered changing their auditors in the
past five years, and the reasons for this (selected
from a list of 26 potential reasons). Only 34% had
not considered changing their auditors at all, while
24% had considered the matter very seriously,
11% seriously, 10% fairly seriously and 21%
casually. Table 5 provides a complete breakdown
of all the stated reasons cited as contributing to the
consideration of a change in auditor. It should be
recognised that a number of the reasons cited over-
lap to some extent. For example, 'use of inexperi-
enced audit engagement staff' (item ranked ninth
equal) may contribute to an overall 'dissatisfaction
with audit quality' (item ranked second). The 139
companies cited a total of 467 reasons, an average
of 3.3 contributory reasons each.
The two most common reasons cited related to
problems with the audit per se and were the level
of audit fee (66%) and dissatisfaction with audit
quality (defined as the auditor's ability to detect
problems) (33%). Eighteen other reasons were,
however, cited by a significant (i.e. ^5%) percent-
age of companies. Of these reasons, five related to
problems with the quality of the relationship with
the audit team (high turnover of audit engagement
staff, use of inexperienced audit engagement staff.
personality clashes with audit partner/staff, poor
working relationships with audit partner/staff and
inaccessibility of audit partner), eight related to
structural changes at the auditee, (top management
changes, growth, auditor rationalisation, merger,
and need for additional services. Big Six firm, multi-
national firm or industry specialist), two related to
changes concerning the audit firm (audit firm
merger and change in audit partner), two related to
third party infiuences (merchant banker/underwriter
and capital providers) and one concerned disagree-
ments over accounting principles.
Of the 56 companies that had undergone an
('« voluntary change in auditor due to an audit firm
merger (not shown in Table), 19 (33%) cited this
as a contributory reason for considering further
change. It may be noted, given the recent Cadbury
Report (1992) recommendations on the rotation of
audit partners, that 11 % of respondents cited this
as a reason for considering an auditor change.
Disagreements concerning accounting principles
were cited by 9% of companies as a reason for
considering auditor change, with 4% citing dis-
agreement with the audit opinion. This is suggestive
that auditor changes may in some cases arise from
'opinion shopping'.
236 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
We again segmented the respondents into those
with/without an audit committee. Based on chi-
squared tests, there was no significant association
(at the 5% level) between any of the top five stated
reasons for considering change and the existence of
an audit committee.
Also using a chi-squared test, we investigated
whether the stated reasons for consideration of
auditor change were associated with the seriousness
with which change was considered. To avoid low
cell frequencies, adjacent categories were combined
to form a 'more serious' group (n = 73) and a 'less
serious' group (n = 66), Four reasons were cited
significantly more frequently (at the 5% level) by
the more serious group: dissatisfaction with audit
quality (p = 0,001); company growth (p = 0,002);
auditor rationalisation (p = 0,048); and need for
Big Six firm (p = 0.001), These issues relate prim-
arily to structural changes at the auditee. Interest-
ingly, however, the most frequently cited reason
overall (level of audit fee) showed no statistically
significant difference.
When asked to rank the three most important
reasons for considering an auditor change, a similar
pattern of responses to that in Table 5 emerged, as
can be seen from Table 6,
Clearly there will, in many cases, exist a relation-
ship between the desirability of audit firm charac-
teristics and change drivers, since if a company
is considering a change of auditor, then this ritay
indicate that its current auditor is not satisfactory
with respect to a characteristic which is rated
important (although there can be other reasons,
e,g, an auditor rationalisation policy). We there-
fore investigated the consistency of the relationship
between the three most important change drivers
and the desirability of audit firm characteristics.
We hypothesised that the 45 respondents who cited
'level of audit fee' as the most important reason
for considering auditor change would rate 'low
absolute level of audit fee' as a more important
audit firm characteristic than the other respondents
who had considered change. Based on a t-test, a
statistically significant difference in the expected
direction did exist between the two groups (t = 1,79,
p = 0,038, one-tailed).
Similarly, we hypothesised that the 24 respond-
ents who cited 'dissatisfaction with audit quality'
as the second most important reason for consider-
ing auditor change would rate 'audit quality' as a
more important characteristic than the others. In
this case, although the difference between the two
groups was in the expected direction, it was not
statistically significant ( t=1.08, p = 0,144), The
third most important reason for considering auditor
change, 'changes in company's top management',
has no related auditor characteristic.
Of the 139 companies that had considered chang-
ing their auditors, 37 (27%) did actually effect a
change while 102 (73%) did not. The reasons given
by the non-changers are summarised in Table 7,
Fee reduction by the incumbent auditor was most
frequently cited, either singly or in combination
with other factors. The most common single reason
Table 6
The Three Most Important Stated Reasons for Considering Auditor Change
Stated reason
1, Level of audit fee
2, Dissatisfaction with audit
quality (i,e, auditor's ability
to detect problems)
3, Changes in company's top
management
4, High turnover of audit
engagement staff
5, Need for group auditor
rationalisation
6, Merger/takeover with/by
another company
7, Use of inexperienced audit
engagement staff
Notes:
•Superscripts indicate the citation frequency of stated reason within each top three slot (thus, for example,
six respondents cited 'changes in company's top management' as the most important reason for considering
auditor change and this was the fifth most frequently cited such reason),
•Stated reasons are shown in decreasing frequency of total citations across the three top slots.
Most
important
45'
24=
,16 =
47 =
9'
213 =
Individual ranking frequency *
2nd most 2rd most
important important
23'
6"=
7'=
9=
73=
410
, 1 3 =
10' =
10' =
6"
55
46=
—
8'
Total'
78
40
19
15
15
13
11
Group citation
frequency
(from
Table 5)
1
2
3
6
5
7=
9=
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Table 7
Reasons for Not Changing Auditors Following Consideration of Change
Reason
1. Incumbent auditor offered reduced audit fee
2. Avoidance of disruption and loss of management time
3. Incumbent auditor offered improved quality of service
4. Change of audit partner
5. 'Other'
Note: Reasons are shown in descending frequency of combined frequency of citation.
Sole
reason
cited
19
26
14
3
13
Number of companies
Contributor)
reason
23
13
14
—
7
Combined
> frequency
of citation
42
39
28
3
20
%
{n = 102)
41
38
27
3
20
given was, however, avoidance of disruption and
loss of management time. Three respondents men-
tioned change of audit partner as the single reason
for not proceeding with the change. 'Other' reasons
included inertia (four cases), decision pending
(three cases), satisfaction with incumbent auditors
(three cases), lack of suitable alternatives in the
area (one case), advice from merchant bank (one
case) and new shareholder did not insist (one case).
We examined the association between the top
three most important stated reasons for considering
auditor change and the main sole reasons for not
subsequently changing auditors. Where level of
audit fee prompted auditor change consideration,
50% did not change because the incumbent offered
a reduced audit fee, 35% did not change to avoid
disruption and loss of management time and
15% did not change because the incumbent offered
an improved quality of service. The corresponding
figures for dissatisfaction with audit quality and
changes in company's top management were 12%,
44%, 44% and 25%, 25%, 50% respectively.
Discussion
The auditor choice process is clearly a complex
one. Not only does it involve multi-attribute
decision analysis, on the part of one or more indi-
viduals, but these attributes are constantly chang-
ing within a dynamic decision setting. Despite this,
our analysis of 29 potentially desirable audit firm
characteristics does reveal eight uncorrelated under-
lying dimensions: reputation/quality; acceptability
to third parties; value for money; ability to provide
non-audit services; small audit firm; specialist
industry knowledge; non-Big Six large audit firm;
and geographical proximity. These findings are
generally consistent with the findings of Lynn (1987)
in the US and of a recent UK survey (Fitzgerald,
1992). The UK survey was restricted to the con-
sideration of six auditor characteristics and covered
businesses of all sizes, although no precise sampling
details are reported. Regular partner contact was
ranked most important while the lowest competitive
price was ranked least important.
Given the current debate concerning audit fee
competition, an interesting finding to emerge from
the present study is that, although value for money
is ranked as the sixth most important audit firm
characteristic in general, the low absolute level
of audit fee is ranked only 22nd (see Table 2).
In contrast, fee level is the most frequently cited
reason for consideration of a change in auditor.
Fee reduction by incumbent auditors was also the
most frequently cited reason for not changing
auditors. There are two possible explanations of
this result. First, it should be noted that the value
for money concept has two dimensions—price and
quality. During piloting, value for money was a
concept suggested to us several times as an im-
portant auditor characteristic, however it was not
suggested to us as a change driver. It would appear
that when considering change, auditees think in
terms of price or quality, rather than their joint
effect. We therefore maintained this perceptual
distinction in the questionnaire. Second, it may be
that expected audit fees exhibit greater variation
between audit firms than other auditor character-
istics, and thus will induce change more frequently.
In comparing Table 5 with Tables 2 and 4 it can
be seen that in many cases auditor change is
considered due to an emergent problem which
affects a highly ranked auditor characteristic. For
example, a high turnover of audit engagement staff
has an adverse impact on the quality of working
relationships with audit engagement staff. In other
cases, a change in the structural characteristics
of the auditee (e.g. company growth) changes the
relative importance of auditor characteristics, with
the incumbent no longer able to provide the re-
quired service. In a final class of cases, the structural
characteristics of the auditor change (e.g. audit
firm merger), with the result that the incumbent
again fails to provide the service required.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to contribute towards
an understanding of auditor/client relationships.
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since the changing nature of these relationships, in
aggregate, profoundly affects the market for audit
services in the UK. Questionnaire responses from
210 listed companies are analysed to reveal funda-
mental aspects of the auditor choice process, such
as the importance of audit firm characteristics, the
reasons for changing auditor and the reasons for
retaining the incumbent.
Significant within-group variation existed in
companies' views on the desirability of audit firm
characteristics. This variation is partially explained
in terms of company size and industry group.
Large companies rated several characteristics
(including technical competence, quality issues and
specialist industry knowledge) of significantly more
importance than small companies; large companies
were, however, less concerned about the absolute
audit fee, perhaps because it represents a smaller
proportion of operating costs for such companies.
Capital goods companies rated the quality of work-
ing relationship with audit partner and common
group auditor of significantly more importance than
financial companies, and willingness to provide
detailed cost information of more importance than
consumer goods companies. Financial companies,
not surprisingly, rated specialist industry knowl-
edge of more importance than the other three
industrial groups.
Factor analysis revealed eight uncorrelated audit
firm dimensions of importance to companies—
the top four being reputation/quality, acceptability
to third parties, value for money and ability to
provide non-audit services. The nature of the much
discussed 'Big Six factor' is partially revealed by
our findings. This factor is itself multidimensional,
encompassing, in particular, reputation/quality,
acceptability to third parties and specialist industry
knowledge. This provides empirical support for the
quality, credibility and specialist knowledge argu-
ments of DeAngelo (1981b), Dopuch and Simunic
(1980 and 1982) and Simunic and Stein (1986)
respectively.
Although the absolute level of audit fee was not
ranked as an important audit firm characteristic
over the sample as a whole, audit fees were the
principal cause of consideration of auditor change.
The 45 respondents who cited 'level of audit fee' as
the most important reason for auditor change also
tended to rate 'low absolute level of audit fee' as
important. Changes in the structure of the audit
firm, changes in the personnel of the audit team
and top management changes within the auditee
were also common destabilising influences. These
changes principally include audit firm merger,
change in audit partner (which is recommended
in the Cadbury Code of Best Practice (1992)) and
turnover of audit staff. Moreover, two-thirds of all
companies have, to a greater or lesser degree,
considered changing their auditors recently. This
may be taken as an indication of underlying
instability in auditor/client relationships. Of those
who considered change, but did not actually change,
fee reduction by the incumbent was the most
frequently cited reason for retaining the status quo.
This paper has two main limitations which are
suggestive of further research. First, it must be
emphasised that we have investigated the reasons
for the consideration of auditor change and not
the reasons for actual changes. Both issues are
of interest in their own right, with the former
permitting inferences about the latter. The number
of respondents within our sample who actually
changed auditors is quite low (n = 36), and does
not permit meaningful analysis.'• Second, this paper
is based on the analysis of declared responses,
collected by means of a postal questionnaire. Cor-
roboration of these results using publicly available
secondary data is desirable.
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